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ABSTRACT

This thesis traces the events that led to the successful use of
the technique of inoculation to prevent the outbreak of smallpox
epidemics in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. It
also provides an insight into the leadership role played by General
Washington in bringing about the policy of inoculation for the
soldiers in his command.
Ever since the smallpox virus was introduced to the North
American continent by the European explorers and settlers in the
colonial period, there had been controversy over the desirability of
inoculation as a means of controlling the disease. It was known, of
course, that if a victim recovered from an attack of smallpox he or
she was assured of lifetime immunity. The controversy developed over
the risks involved in deliberately spreading the infection. Since
most people were afraid of contracting the deadly smallpox in any
form, the procedure of inoculation remained under a cloud. In many of
the colonies, inoculation was officially banned.
The Revolutionary War helped bring the inoculation controversy to
a head. Smallpox epidemics debilitated the ranks of the Continental
Army in the Canadian campaign of 1775-6. As a result, General
Washington made the calculated decision to inoculate all of his troops
despite the risk. Fortunately, his judgment proved sound. From 1777
onwards, as a result of a mandatory program of inoculation, the
smallpox virus was virtually eradicated as a threat to the health of
the Continental Army.

v

SMALLPOX, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, AND GENERAL WASHINGTON

INTRODUCTION

"The Smallpox is a more terrible Enemy than the British Troops."
(Governor Jonathan Trumbull of
Connecticut to John Hancock,
president of the Continental
Congress in Philadelphia, July
5, 1776.)

Smallpox is believed to have originated in Africa, tracing back
as far as 10,000 B.C.

From there it was carried by infected men,

women, and children to the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the
Americas.

For centuries, no one understood the nature of the disease

and there was no known cure.
every color and race alike.

It struck young and old, rich and poor,
It was extremely contagious and the

infection was thought to have been spread by physical contact with
contaminated persons or objects.
Epidemics of smallpox would appear periodically and unannounced.
In some of the larger population centers, it was endemic and thus
existed as a continually menacing presence.

Once infected, the victim

was likely to die within a matter of weeks.

The affliction was

extremely painful and horribly disfiguring.

If the patients did

manage to survive, it often left them with pockmarked skins, lameness,

2

3

blindness, loss of hair, and other crippling and unsightly
disabilities.

Recovering from an attack of smallpox did have one

major beneficial side-effect: the individual was assured of lifetime
immunity.

When an epidemic of smallpox had run its course, it would

generally subside as quickly as it had appeared leaving a trail of
death and mutilation in its wake.
would return.

There was no telling if and when it

The fatality rate could range from 10% to over 90%.

Smallpox, introduced by the Spanish into South and Central
America and by the French into Canada in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, was considered to have been the chief killer disease
responsible for wiping out entire native Indian societies in these
regions.

The same catastrophe took its toll of the local Indian

tribes when the English established their colonies along the Atlantic
seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The European

settlers, many of whom over the years had developed immunity to
smallpox, fared somewhat better.

Nevertheless, they still suffered

grievous losses from the periodic visitations of smallpox epidemics.
"In 1736 Dr. Benjamin Gale wrote to Dr. John Huxham, the English
physician, that one in every seven or eight infected with smallpox in
America died.

The study made by William Douglass showed a death rate

of one out of every seven cases in the Boston epidemic of 1721.
latter outbreak was one of the worst in colonial history."^

1
John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 22.

The

At the

4

mere rumor of smallpox, many people would pack their belongings and
flee from their homes in the towns and cities for the relative safety
of the countryside in order to try to avoid the pestilential
infection.
Amidst the hysteria, superstition, and fear that gripped the
American colonists at the first sign of a smallpox outbreak one
rational conclusion did emerge from their experiences.

Quarantining

and isolating infected victims were positive means of controlling and
containing the ravages of the contagion.

Since it was obvious at a

fairly early date to the colonists, especially those in the port
cities along the coast, that smallpox was arriving in their
communities by way of infected victims on board contaminated ships,
they quickly initiated steps to place any suspected vessels under
strict quarantine.

For example, in 1647 the Boston authorities

established a quarantine procedure for all passengers and crew members
on board ships originating from the West Indies, believed to have been
a prime source of the disease.

The quarantine procedures initiated in

Boston were taken up as well by several of the other port cities.
New York City in 1690 followed suit with its first quarantine measure
specifically directed at a ship from St. Nevis carrying small-pox
2
infected slaves.
Isolation of smallpox victims was the other method of control

2
Donald R. Hopkins, Princes and Peasants: Smallpox in History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 238.

5

that soon became an accepted expedient.

The selectmen of Salem in the

Massachusetts Bay colony, for instance, issued an order in 1678 that
sought to isolate smallpox victims who were found to be infected on
shore as opposed to those who were shipboard victims.

Virginia, in

1667, is said to have passed some of the earliest mandatory
legislation in the colonies to ensure the safe isolation of smallpox
3
patients.
The next logical step it seems would have been to
construct hospitals for smallpox cases.

The records show, however,

that the only hospital in colonial North America that was specifically
established to care for smallpox patients was the Hotel-Dieu in Quebec
4
founded in 1639.
Special hospital facilities for isolating and
treating smallpox sufferers would not arrive in the American colonies
until the advent of the Revolutionary War.
The single best hope for actually preventing smallpox rested in
the technique of inoculation.

Probably most Americans, both in pre-

Revolutionary days and during the Revolution itself, considered
inoculation against smallpox to be a mixed blessing, i.e. if the
patient recovered, it was clearly a success; and if the patient died,
then it was of course a failure.

Despite the ongoing controversy,

public opinion was gradually moving in the direction of inoculation.
The reason was plain.

The certainty of obtaining lifetime immunity

from this killer disease was apparently worth the risk involved in

3

Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 238.

4Ibid., 238-9.

6

accepting the inoculation procedure; particularly if the risk was seen
to be diminishing.
record.

The final and decisive argument was the track

"The steadily increasing success of inoculation in Boston is

clearly illustrated by a chart published at the end of the eighteenth
century by the Massachusetts Historical Society:
Date

No. Inoculated

1721

247

5

1 in 42

1730

400

12

1 in 33

1752

2,109

31

1 in 70

1764

4,977

46

1 in 108

1776

4,988

28

1 in 178

1778

2,121

19

1 in 112"'

The progress was impressive.

Deaths

Proportion

Nevertheless, inoculation still

remained a highly controversial procedure.

For one thing, the

techniques employed in infecting the patients were usually primitive,
unscientific, and amateurish.

Second, many of the so-called "doctors"

who offered inoculation for a fee were little more than quacks and
imposters.

And third, the common sense safeguards during the critical

period of infection were frequently neglected or disregarded.

People

tended to go about their routine affairs blithely ignoring the serious
danger of spreading the virus.

The inoculated patients thus

inadvertently became the carriers of a highly contagious disease.

^Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 36.
6Ibid., 38.

7

Consequently, there were two opposing schools of thought that
developed with respect to the practice of inoculation, and public
opinion would swing back-and-forth between the two poles depending
upon the real or perceived threat of an outbreak of smallpox.

All of

the thirteen colonies at different times over the decades of the 1700s
passed legislation regulating and controlling the practice of
inoculation.

The degree of enforcement, however, ranged from strict

to indifferent, with fear being the governing factor.
epidemic threatened, the laws were relaxed.

When an

When the danger was

safely passed, the rules were once again upheld.

Occasionally, too,

the anger and agitation that was aroused by the inoculation

dispute

would result in acts of outright violence
The Reverend Cotton Mather, the notable Puritan divine, and Dr.
Zabdiel Boylston, a Boston physician, are credited with introducing
the technique of inoculation to America in the summer of 1721 during
the course of the great smallpox epidemic in Boston that year.

On

June 26th, Dr. Boylston "used a 'sharp toothpick arid quill’to
inoculate his only son Thomas (age six), and two Negro slaves with pus
from a smallpox patient

All three developed favorable mild

infections, which made them immune."^

Even though this pioneering

experiment turned out successfully, both men had to suffer severe
abuse and villification for their respective roles in this
humanitarian effort.

It was a paradox that would continue well into

the Revolutionary War years.

^Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 249.

8

The Reverend Cotton Mather, over and above his spiritual duties,
nourished a long-standing interest in medicine.

Through the years,

Mather observed and noted the different diseases prevalent in Boston
and elsewhere; although, as far as is known, he himself never engaged
in any medical experiments or research.

However, he diligently

corresponded with leading scientists in England and on the Continent,
as well as with his compatriots in the medical profession in the
colonies.

The close ties that he established with key figures in the

Royal Society in London, the worldwide clearinghouse for scientific
knowledge, would in later years prove mutually helpful in furthering
the cause of inoculation on both sides of the Atlantic.
Approaching his sixtieth birthday in 1720, Cotton Mather decided
to pull together all of his medical writings and correspondence into a
single compilation to be called, The

Angel of Bethesda. The book was

completed but never published in his

lifetime (it first appeared in

print in 1972); perhaps because of some of the controversial practices
that he advanced and advocated therein.

In one chapter - "CAP.

XX. Variolae triumphatae: The Small-Pox Encountered." - he listed in
lengthy detail the symptoms as well as the measures to be used in
alleviating the physical and emotional distresses caused by the
disease.

In the "Appendix" to this chapter, he then shared with his

readers a remarkable breakthrough that had apparently come to his
notice by sheer coincidence:
There has been a Wonderful

Practice lately used in

several Parts of the World, which indeed

is not yett become

9

common in our Nation.
I was first instructed in it, by a Guramantee-Servant
of my own, long before I knew that any Europeans or
Asiaticks had the least Acquaintance with it; and some years
before I was Enriched with the Communications of the Learned
Foreigners, whose Accounts I found agreeing with what I
received of my Servant, when he showed me the Scar of the
Wound made for the Operation; and said, That no Person Ever
died of the Small-Pox, in their Countrey that had the
Courage to use it.^
What the Reverend Mather was referring to, of course, was the
technique of inoculation.

The story that he had claimed to have heard

originally from his North African slave, Qnisemus (a native of
9
Fezznan, a region in southern Tripoli) , was confirmed by "two
reports on variolation published in the Philosophical Transactions in
1714 and 1 7 1 6 . While these scientific reports aroused only
academic interest in England, it is said that they were directly
responsible for the introduction of the practice of inoculation into

g

Cotton Mather, The Angel of Bethesda, Gordon W. Jones, ed.

(Boston: American Antiquarian Society and Barre Publishers, 1972), 93,
107.
Q

Genevieve Miller, The Adoption of Inoculation for Smallpox.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 53.
10
Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 28.

10

the American colonies.
Cotton Mather, convinced that he had found a practical and
workable solution to controlling smallpox epidemics, began his one-man
campaign to persuade the local medical community to try the novel
procedure on their patients.

12

H ls approach to Dr. William

Douglass, the sole physician in Boston with a medical degree, was
coldly rejected.

The reactions of most of the other conservative

medical men were the same.

Dr. Zabdiel Boylston, it seems, was the

only doctor in town who was willing to risk his reputation and the
lives of his patients (including his own son as well as several of the
Mather offspring) in the inoculation experiment.

Boylston had

apparently also heard similar stories from local slaves who were
familiar with the practice in their native regions.

13

The outbreak

in Boston of the serious smallpox epidemic of 1721 gave Dr. Boylston
the unique opportunity to test on a relatively large-scale the
effectiveness of the smallpox procedure.
One Saturday in mid-April 1721, two British ships fresh
from the West Indies sailed past the quarantine station on

12

"Assuming every apothecary to have been a physician, there

were then [in 1721] in the Town [Boston] fourteen."

Samuel G. Drake,

History and Antiquities of Boston, From Its Settlement In 1630, To the
Year 1770.
13

(Boston: Published by Luther Stevens, 1836), 561n.

Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.

11

Spectacle Island and docked at Boston's Long Wharf.

On

board the Seahorse, two blacks were ill with smallpox and
several other crewmen were incubating the infection.

The

first two men were confined to houses near the shore, but
the disease still began to spread.

On 26 May, Cotton Mather

wrote in his diary, 'The grievous calamity of the smallpox
has now entered the town.'^
The response by the Bostonians to the program of inoculation was
immediate, violent, and wholly unanticipated by its promoters.

"As

soon as the news was made public, a 'horrid clamour' arose from many
people in Boston, who held that inoculation was a heathen practice and
should not be adopted by C h r i s t i a n s . C o t t o n Mather was surprised
and shocked by the demonstrations of anger and outrage.

He wrote in

The Angel of Bethesda that, "the Vilest Arts were used, and with such
an Efficacy, that not only the Physician, but also the Patients under
the Small-Pox Inoculated were in hazard of their very Lives from an
Infuriated People."

16

Nor was the Revered Mather himself spared

from the fury of an aroused populace.

The hysteria and wrath

culminated for him when an explosive device flew through the window of
his house:
But I myself had thrown into my House in the Dead of the

14
Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 247.
15

Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.

"^Mather, Angel of Bethesda, 113.

12

Night, a fired Granado, charged with Combustible Matter, and
in such a Manner, that upon its going off, it must probably
have killed them that were near it, and would have certainly
fired the Chamber and speedily have laid the House in Ashes.
But the merciful Providence of God our SAVIOUR so ordered
it, that the Granado passing thro' the Window, had by the
Iron in the Middle of the Casement such a Turn given to it,
that in falling on the Floor, the fired Wild-fire in the
Fuse, was violently shaken out some Distance from the Shell,
and burnt out upon the Floor, without firing off the
Granado.^^
The ultimate insult, however, arrived in the form of a note
apparently attached in some fashion to the above-described fire-bomb.
It read:

"COTTON MATHER, You Dog, Dam you, I'll inoculate you with

this, with a Pox to you."

18

Mather was not intimidated by the live

bomb nor by the threatening message.

While he deplored the passions

of the reckless opposition, he went right ahead with his outspoken
support of the inoculation experiments, in which he continued to
express complete confidence:
The Opposition was carried on with a Folly, and
Falsehood, and Malice, hardly ever known to be paralled'd on
any Occasion; And in the Progress of the Distemper many

18
Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.

13

Hundreds of Lives were Lost, which might have been Saved, if
the People had not been Satanically filled with Prejudices
against this Method of Safety. However, the Practice went
on, and tho1 the Physician was under Extreme Disadvantage on
more Accounts than one, yett he was attended with Vast
Success. The Experiment has now been made on Several
Hundreds of Persons; and upon both Male and Female, both old
and

young, both Strong and Weak, both White and Black, at

all

Seasons, of Summer and Autumn and Winter: And they have

generally professed, they had rather undergo the Small-Pox
Inoculated once every year, than undergo the Small-Pox once
19
in their Lives after the Common Way, tho* sure to Live.
The scorecard - when the statistical evidence was in - was
impressive.
numbered
persons.
patients."

"By the

following February [1722] when the epidemicwhich

5,889 cases of smallpox was over, Boylston had inoculated242
Of 835 deaths from smallpox, only six were among inoculated

20

But the opponents of inoculation were not convinced.

Dr. William Douglass in Boston was the leading voice of the anti
inoculation claque.

Ihe gist of his arguments against inoculation are

summarized in his letter of May 1, 1722, to Dr. Cadwallader Colden in
New York:
I oppose this novel and dubious practice, not being

19

Mather, Angel of Bethesda, 113.

20Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 93.

14

sufficiently assured of its safety and consequences; in
short I reckon it a sin to propagate infection by this means
and bring on my neighbor a distemper which might prove fatal
and which perhaps he might escape (as many have done) in the
ordinary way, and which he might certainly secure himself by
removal in this Country where it prevails seldom.

However,

many of our clergy had got into it and they scorn to
retract; I had them to appease, which occasioned great Heats
(you may perhaps admire how they reconcile this with their
doctrine of predestination).

21

The charges and counter-charges that were flung from the pulpit
and the words bandied about in the pamphlet wars apparently changed
few minds in the colonies.

But in England it was another story.

"The

news from Boston took several months to reach London, and the
opponents to inoculation made themselves heard first.

At the November

16, 1721 meeting of the Royal Society a letter was read from William
Douglass

telling that in September around 1000 cases of smallpox

were reported and that sixty had been inoculated.
had died."

22

Of these one or two

The implication of this letter and similar reports in

the same tenor was that inoculation had helped to spread the disease.
Cotton Mather was not far behind in presenting to the Royal
Society his positive version of the events in Boston during the 1721

21
22

Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 30.
Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 93-4.

15

smallpox epidemic.

"As early as August 17, 1721, when Boylston had

had seventeen successful inoculations, Cotton Mather had resolved to
prepare a treatise on inoculation in order that 'it may be introduced
into the English Nation, and a World of good may be done to the
23
miserable Children of Men.'"

The statement - An Account of the

Method and Success of Inoculating the Small-Pox in Boston in NewEngland. In a Letter from a Gentleman There, to His Friend in London.
- together with a compendium of related material, reached the Royal
Society the following year (1722).

These findings were duly published

24
in their Philosophical Transactions.
The hard statistical data that had been accumulated in Boston was
carefully studied by the scientific community in England.

"Both

Cotton Mather and Boylston realzied the significance of this
statistical approach, which involved one of the first historical
instances of the quantitative analysis of a medical problem.

They

assumed that inoculation would stand or fall on the basis of the
'calculus of probabilities' of death under the two types of
infection."

25

As it turned out, the findings were heavily in favor

of the technique of inoculation.

"The danger of death was at most

23Ibid., 94.
2h b i d . , 94-5.
25

Otho T. Beall, Jr. and Richard H. Shryock, Cotton Mather:

First Significant Figure in American Medicine (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1954), 108.

16

only one-sixth as great in artificial as in natural infection."

26

By their combined endeavors, Messrs. Mather and Boylston had taken an
important step in publicizing the demonstrable benefits of
inoculation.

"Their findings

made a marked impression at the time

and thus became one essential link in the sequence that led eventually
to a considerable adoption of the practice in both Europe and
America.
Thanks mainly to the progressive and farsighted policies of the
Royal Society, the pioneer advocates of inoculation in the American
colonies continued to look to it for support.
disappointed.

They were not

Dr. Boylston may have been regarded as a pariah in

Boston, but when he visited London he was warmly welcomed and
conspicuously honored.

"Dr. Zabdiel Boylston, elected F.R.S. [Fellow

of the Royal Society] on July 7, 1726, after the publication of his
book on the New England experience."

28

Unfortunately, Cotton

Mather, who died in 1727/8 but who had long claimed to have been a
F.R.S., missed receiving the personal accolades of his London
colleagues that were surely his due.
In Charleston, South Carolina, in 1738, following in the
footsteps of the Reverend Mather and Dr. Boylston, Dr. James
Kirkpatrick was the only physician in that town who was willing to

27Ibid., 118.
no

Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 128.

17

inoculate patients during a serious outbreak of smallpox.
inoculated eight hundred persons, of whom only eight died."
low rate of fatalities was a remarkable achievement.

"He
29

The

However, Dr.

Kirkpatrick - like Dr. Boylston before him - had to travel to London
to receive recognition for his work.

In 1734, he published his Essay

on Inoculation which gave new and valuable ammunition to the
inoculation cause.

The founding of the Small-Pox and Inoculation

Hospital in London in 1746 together with the publicity being generated
on behalf of the immunizing procedure gave new impetus to the revival
of the practice of inoculation.

30

After years of acrimonious controversy and often heated debates,
inoculation was finally given an official stamp of approval by the
prestigious Royal College of Physicians at a meeting in London on
December 22, 1755:
The College being informed that the Success of
inoculating the Small Pox, and its reputation in this
Country, have lately been Misrepresented among Foreigners,
came to the following Resolution.
That in their Opinion the Objections made at first to
it have been refuted by experience, and that it is at
present more generally esteemed and Practised in England
than ever, and that they Judge it to be a Practice of the

29
Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 254.
30Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 134.

18

utmost benefit to Mankind.

31

That consensus judgment by a board of medical experts effectively
settled the dispute.

’’From this time there was no professional

resistance to inoculation."

32

And gradually the English people came

to accept inoculation and to recognize it as a safe procedure.

For

all practical purposes, therefore, the inoculation controversy in
England had evaporated.

Public facilities were soon established to

offer smallpox care and inoculation; not only to the wealthy classes
but to the poorer classes as well.

The Small-Pox and Inoculation

Hospital in London, for example, reported in 1757 after ten years of
operation, "that 3506 victims of natural smallpox had been treated,
and 1252 persons had received inoculation."

33

It is important to note (particularly as it pertains to the
subject matter of this paper) that the British Army was among the
first to adopt a smallpox policy for all of its new recruits.

One

authority (Sylvia R. Frey in her book, The British Soldier in America)
on His Majesty's armies in America during the Revolutionary War has
written as follows on the subject of the practice of smallpox
inoculation:
To counteract the exceptional mortality produced by
this disease [smallpox], the [British] army adopted the
practice of inoculation.

31Ibid., 170.
32

Ibid.

^Ibid., 152.

At the beginning of the Seven

19

Years War, seven out of every nine soldiers in infantry
regiments had smallpox, and nearly one in four who contracted
it, "in the natural way" died.

By the beginning of the

Revolution, smallpox rarely occurred in epidemic proportions
among army personnel.^
By having already adopted inoculation as official Army policy, the
British forces fighting in the American colonies in 1775-1783
enjoyed a decided medical advantage over their adversaries, at least
in the early stages of the conflict.
Broadly speaking, the thirteen American colonies modeled their
institutions on British precedents.

The medical profession was no

exception but for the fact that in this category it lagged far behind.
There was, for instance, nothing resembling - in function, prestige,
or authority - the Royal College of Physicians.
was still in its infancy.

Medicine in America

Colonel Louis Duncan in his book, Medical

Men in the American Revolution 1775-1783, summarizes the state of the
profession in the period leading up to the war:
At the close of the Colonial government there were two
American medical colleges: one in Philadelphia, founded in
1763; the other in New York, founded in 1768.

The

operations of both were suspended by the war.

Up to that

34

Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social

History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1981), 43.

20

time they had conferred less than fifty medical degrees.
Boston, although a medical center, had as yet no school of
medicine

In 1775 there was but one State medical

society, that of New Jersey organized in 1766
also but few hospitals.

There were

A hospital had been founded in

Philadelphia as early as 1755.....The second permanent
hospital was that in New York.
destroyed by fire in 1774.

Erected in 1771 it had been

35

Except for a tiny intellectual elite - there were only a few
foreign trained physicians in the colonies - the views of the English
scientific and medical communities had no significant audience on this
side of the Atlantic.

The latest statistical findings and the

techniques for controlling smallpox by inoculation that were being
actively promoted and adopted in England were not as widely
disseminated or as well-known in America.

Thus, inoculation continued

to be a practice regarded with irrational fear and looked upon with
superstition.

Public attitudes were still heavily shaped and

influenced by rumors, gossip, and local prejudices.
tended to translate into legislation.

These beliefs

"At one time or another nearly

all the colonies prohibited the practice [of inoculation], but many of
the laws either lapsed or were subsequently amended or repealed."

36

35
Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 17751783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service School, 1931),
7-8.
36
Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 38.

21

Virginia is an interesting case in point.

In Norfolk, in the

late 1760s, James Parker, one of its wealthiest citizens, ’’provoked
violent riots when they [he and his supporters] inoculated their
families against the smallpox."

37

These Norfolk riots are said to

have led directly to the passage of the following Virginia statute
(published in November of 1768):
An act to regulate the inoculation of the Small-Pox within
this colony.
I.

WHEREAS the wanton introduction of the Small-Pox into

this colony by inoculation, when the same was not necessary,
hath, of late years, proved a nuisance to several
neighbourhoods, by disturbing the peace and quietness of
many of his majesty’s subjects, and exposing their lives to
the infection of that mortal distemper, which, from the
situation and circumstances of the colony, they would
otherwise have little reason to dread: To prevent which for
the future, Be It enacted, by the Governor Council, and
Burgesses, of this present General Assembly, and it is
hereby enacted, by the authority of the same, That if any
person or persons whatsoever, shall wilfully, or designedly,
after the first day of September next ensuing, presume to
import or bring into this colony, from any country or place
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whatever, the small-pox, or any variolous or infectious
matter of the said distemper, with a purpose to inoculate
any person or persons whatever, or by any means whatever, to
propagate the said distemper within this colony, he or she,
so offending, shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand
pounds, for every offence so committed.

38

Some fifty-plus years after Cotton Mather and Zabdiel Boylston in
Boston had introduced the controversial technique of inoculation into
the American colonies, the ongoing inoculation debate finally came to
a head for the Continental Army (if not necessarily for the civilian
population) during the War of Independence.

Most of the leaders of

the Revolution - military and political - would undoubtedly have
agreed with the sentiments expressed by Governor Jonathan Trumbull of
Connecticut when he wrote to John Hancock, the president of the
Continental Congress in Philadelphia, on July 3, 1776:
is a more terrible Enemy than the British Troops."

39

"The Smallpox
The question

on which they disagreed - often quite passionately - was whether
inoculation was the problem or the cure.

This was the key issue that

General Washington, as Commander-in-Chief, was called upon to address
and hopefully to resolve.
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CHAPTER I

GENERAL WASHINGTON AND THE SMALLPOX

George Washington's own bout with the smallpox began when he was
suddenly stricken by the disease on a trip to the Caribbean island of
Barbados in 1751.

The nineteen-year-old Washington had accompanied

his older half-brother, Lawrence, who was seeking relief in a tropical
climate for his tubercular condition.
had apparently contracted the virus.
smallpox is dated November 4th, 1751:

Shortly after landing, George
His first diary entry mentioning
"This morning received a card

from Major Clarke, welcoming us to Barbadoes, with an invitation to
breakfast and dine with him.

We went, - myself with some reluctance,

as the smallpox was in his family."^

Washington later confided in

his diary that he "was strongly attacked with the small Pox: sent for
Dr. Lanahan whose attendance was very constant till my recovery, and
going out which was not 'till thursday the 12th of December."

2

During the twenty-six days of his illness, Washington went

^Donald Jackson, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 1748-65
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, 1925), _I:73.
2
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington
1748 - 1770 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), _I:25.
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through an agonizing period of severe pain and acute suffering and
discomfort.

Starting with a high fever on November 17th, the disease

progressed to violent headaches and pains in the back and loins.

Then

red spots appeared on his forehead and among the hair roots.

These

soon turned into thickly set papules and finally to vesicles.

The

postules that developed from the vesicles eventually dried up and were
replaced by scabs that itched furiously until they fell off.
Underneath the scabs were reddish brown spots.

"George knew that

these would leave 'pits' which he would carry with him through life,
but he had won the fight that almost every man of his generation
3
expected to have to wage."
How did Washington manage to recuperate from a disease that was
usually considered to be fatal once contracted?

Donald Jackson,

editor of the most recent edition of Washington's Diaries, theorized
that, "it is conceivable that GW [George Washington] had been
inoculated sometime before his trip to Barbados, causing his attack to
be a relatively mild one."

Zj.

Whatever the explanation, George

Washington now enjoyed lifetime immunity.

Furthermore, his personal

experiences with the disease apparently left him convinced that
inoculation was the only real and meaningful control.

He subsequently

became a fervent and outspoken advocate of the procedure, in spite of

3
Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington: A Biography
(N.Y.: Scribner, 1948), One:253.
^Jackson, Diaries of George Washington,

33.
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the acknowledged risks involved.
Having successfully survived his attack of smallpox, the record
shows that Washington was next concerned to protect his valuable but
vulnerable human property, his slaves, from the scourge.

When several

of his slaves were stricken with the smallpox in the spring of 1760,
Washington moved quickly to halt the contagion:
[I] received letters from Winchester informing me that
the Small Pox had got among my Quarter’s in Frederick;
determined therefore to leave Town [Williamsburg] as soon as
possible and proceed up to them

I was informd that Harry

& Kit, the first of my Negroes that took the Small Pox were
Dead and Roger & Phillis the only two down with it were
recovering from it

After taking the Doctrs. Direction's

in regard to my People I set out for my Quarters

Engagd.

Vale. Crawford to go in pursuit of a Nurse to be ready in
case more of my People shd. be seized with the same
disorder

Got Blankets and every other requisite from

Winchester & settld things upon the best footing I could to
prevt. the Small Pox from Spreading - and in case of its
spreading for the care of the Negroes.

Mr. Vale. Crawford

agreeing in case any more of the People at the lower
Quarters getting it to take them home to his House - & if
any of those of the Upper Quarter gets it to have them
5
removd into my Room and the Nurse sent for.

5Ibid., 273, 276-7.
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Washington, of course, was just as concerned with protecting the
members of his own immediate family as he was with protecting his
slave property.

In the spring of 1771, an interesting family episode

occurred that throws further light on the extent of Washington's faith
in inoculation.

His stepson, John Parke Custis, or "Jackie" as he was

affectionately called, seemingly on his own initiative had sought to
become immunized.

"Jackie's” tutor, the Reverend Jonathan Boucher,

agreed to act as the intermediary in this delicate matter since Mrs.
Washington felt very uneasy about exposing her only son to the hazards
of the inoculation procedure.

According to Washington's biographer,

Douglas Southall Freeman, "Martha had expressed her wish that her son
might have this protection but she never had been able to bring
herself to approve the required step.

She had said, in fact, that she

wished 'Jackie' might be inoculated and might be out of danger before
she knew anything about it, so that, in Washington's words, 'she might
escape those tortures which suspense would threw her into, little as
the cause might be for it.'"

6

With Washington's explicit but tacit

consent, the Reverend Boucher took the boy to Baltimore and had him
inoculated surreptitiously there.

Freeman concludes that, "Washington

had never planned a military operation with greater care than he now
displayed in arranging to keep from Martha the news of the inoculation
until 'Jackie' had completely recovered."^

Freeman, George Washington, Three:268.
^Ibid.

Happily for all
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concerned, when his worried mother next saw him, the youngster was
healthy, unmarked, and with nothing to fear from the smallpox for the
rest of his life.
Martha Washington, for reasons best known to herself, stubbornly
resisted inoculation for almost five more years despite the
importunings of her husband.

Only when she visited Washington's

headquarters in New York City in the spring of 1776 and was seriously
exposed to infection did she finally yield.

The General wrote to his

brother, John Augustine Washington, from New York on April 29th that,
"Mrs. Washington is still here, and talks of taking the Small Pox, but
I doubt her resolution."

8

Martha did manage to overcome her long-

held misgivings the next month in Philadelphia.

Washington duly

reported to his brother (John Augustine) on May 31st that, "Mrs.
Washington is now under inoculation in this City [Philadelphia]; and
will, I expect, have the Small pox favourably, this is the 13th day,
g
and she has very few Postules."
True to her husband's prognosis,
Martha fully recovered from her ordeal and was now numbered among the
immune in the Washington family.
Although, as far as is known, Washington had never taken a public
position with respect to inoculation, it is obvious from his own
experiences that he was personally convinced of its efficacy.

This

o
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opinion would be put to the test when Washington took commandof
Continental Army in Cambridge in July of 1775.

the

On the 21st ofthat

month, he wrote to John Hancock mentioning briefly the precautions he
was instituting to prevent any outbreak of the disease:
I have been particularly attentive to the least
Symptoms of the small Pox and hitherto we have been so
fortunate, as to have every Person removd so soon, as not
only to prevent any Communication, but any Alarm or
Apprehension it might give in the Camp.

We shall continue

the utmost Vigilance against that most dangerous Enemy.

10

Practical measures had already been organized by the local
authorities in Cambridge to isolate smallpox victims even before
General Washington arrived to take over his command.

The editors of

the Washington Papers have summarized these measures in this footnote:
A smallpox hospital had been established for the army
near Fresh Pond, which lies about a mile and a half west of
the Cambridge common.

On 19 June 1775 General Ward directed

that a sentry be posted constantly at the gate to the
smallpox hospital with orders 'to permit no person to go in
or out except the Doctor & such as the Doctor shall permit
to pass.1 On 2 July Ward ordered each company in the army

10
W. W. Abbot, ed., The Papers of George Washington
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), Revolutionary
War Series 1:140.
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to be inspected daily for smallpox symptoms. Any man
suspected of having the disease was to be removed at
once.

11

In his very first "General Orders" dated July 4, 1775, at
Cambridge, General Washington, referring to this same smallpox
hospital, attempted to maintain its isolation.

"No Person is to be

allowed to go to Fresh-water pond a fishing or on any other occasion
as there may be a danger of introducing the small pox into the
army."

12

So far, the only precautions that Washington had adopted

to protect his soldiers from epidemics of smallpox were isolation and
quarantine.

Inoculation was apparently not yet considered to be

either necessary or appropriate.

Dr. John Morgan, the Medical

Director of the Continental Army who arrived in Cambridge in November
of 1775, confirmed this policy of isolation and quarantine when he
reported to Washington on December 17th regarding the current status
of the smallpox threat:
And whereas the Small Pox hath made its appearance at
several times in the Army, and a number of persons have been
lately sent out of Boston and landed at point Sherley with
the small pox on them; it is highly expedient, to fix on a
proper place, for conveying such persons to, as may have the
small pox, with the suitable Convenience to prevent its

^Ibid., 58n.
12

Ibid., 55.
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spreading.^
Dr. Morgan’s information that refugees from Boston coming into
the American lines were infected with the smallpox touched a sensitive
nerve.

General Washington had already been alerted by other sources

that the British might be deliberately trying to spread the disease
among his troops.

He had written to John Hancock on December 4th

expressing his serious concern at the rumors that he had heard to this
effect:
By recent information from Boston, Genl Howe is goeing
to Send out a number of the Inhabitants.... there is one
part of the information that I Can hardly give Credit to.

A

Sailor Says that a number of those Comeing out have been
inoculated with design of Spreading the Smallpox thro' this
Country & Camp.

14

A week later (on December 11th), Washington again notified President
Hancock to the effect that:
The information I received that the enemy intended
Spreading the Small pox amongst us, I could not Suppose them
Capable of - I now must give Some Credit to it, as it has
made its appearance on Severall of those who Last Came out
of Boston, every necessary precaution has been taken to
prevent its being Communicated to this Army, & the General

13
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Court will take Care, that it does not Spread through the
Country.^^
It is true that Boston suffered a serious epidemic of smallpox
in the siege of 1773-6, and there may well have been some
justification for suspecting the British of trying to spread the
disease to the Americans.

As a matter of fact, they had resorted to

germ warfare before (although there is no evidence that Washington had
any knowledge of this earlier episode).

One documented incident

occurred during the Pontiac uprising in 1763.

The British General,

Sir Jeffery Amherst, in command of the British Armies in North
America, made this unusual suggestion to his field commander, Colonel
Henry Bouquet:

"Could it not be contrived to send the small pox among

the disaffected tribes of Indians?

We must on this occasion use every

stratagem in our power to reduce them. ’ Bouquet answered that he
would try to spread an epidemic with infected blankets and mentioned a
wish to hunt ’the vermin’ with dogs."

16

Another slightly different

version of the same incident is reported as follows:

"He [General

Amherst] added that he had heard that smallpox had broken out at Fort
Pitt and wondered whether the disease could not be spread to good
advantage.

Bouquet replied, 'I will try to inoculate the bastards

with some blankets that may fall in their hands, and take care not to

15Ibid., 533-4.
16
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get the disease myself.'"^
Whatever the outcome of their germ warfare plans - first against
the Indians and later possibly against the Americans - the devious
intentions by the British to employ the smallpox weapon remained
suspect throughout the Revolution.

Though actual proof of complicity

seems to be lacking, General Washington nevertheless continued to be
apprehensive of the enemy’s motives.

As late as the Yorktown

campaign, he was keenly alert to the smallpox menace while issuing
these warnings (dated September 29, 1781) to his officers on the march
southward:

"Our ungenerous Enemy having as usual propagated the small

Pox in this part of the Country, the Commander in Chief forbids the
Officers and soldiers of this Army [from] having any connection with
the Houses or Inhabitants in this neighbourhood or borrowing any
utensils from them."

18

Another smallpox precaution that Washington initiated took place
when the British evacuated the pestilence-ridden town of Boston in
March of 1776.

He carefully ordered into the area at first only

soldiers who were known to be immune to the smallpox (as he reported
to John Hancock in his letter of March 19th): "As soon as the
Ministerial Troops had quitted the Town, I order’d a Thousand Men (who
had had the Small Pox) under the Command of General Putnam to take

■^John C. Long, Lord Jeffery Amherst: A Soldier of the King
(N.Y.: MacMillan, 1933), 186-7.
18
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possession of the Heights."

19

On July 20th, 1775, General Washington wrote to his brother
Samuel (Washington):

"I came to this place [Cambridge] the 2d Instant

& found a numerous army of Provencials under very little command,
discipline, or order."

20

Men mostly from rural communities who had

never been exposed to the smallpox virus and who consequently had no
immunity to the disease were suddenly thrown together in crude
encampments living in crowded and often insanitary conditions.

An

outbreak of smallpox under these circumstances could have proven to be
a disaster for the Continental Army.

The fact that General

Washington, together with the local Massachusetts authorities and with
the help of his new Medical Director, Dr. John Morgan, were able to
forestall this possibility stands as a tribute to their collective
organizing skills.

Also, the fact that they achieved their goal by

relying solely on the non-controversial measures of quarantine and
isolation demonstrates the effectiveness of these relatively benign
methods of smallpox control.

Thus, up to this stage of the war, there

seemed to be no urgent call for engaging in the risky business of
inoculation.

And General Washington, whatever his personal feelings

or inclinations regarding inoculation, apparently felt no compulsion
to consider taking steps in this direction.

The campaign in Canada,

however, would quickly serve to change his mind.

19Abbot, Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series
3:490.

20Ibid., Revolutionary War Series _1:135.

CHAPTER II

DISASTER IN CANADA

The news from Canada was most distressing.

Dr. John Morgan, the

Medical Director of the Continental Army, wrote as follows from New
York City on June 25th, 1776:

"To the Honorable Samuel Adams Esqr.

Member of the Medical Committee of Congress:"
The State of the Army in Canada, according to Dr.
Lind’s Account (who is just arrived from thence, by Order of
Genl Sullivan, for a Supply of Medicines) is truly
deplorable.

I have seen no Returns of the Sick, but he

assures me, that in the beginning of this Month, there were
no less than 1800 Men down with the Small Pox, and the Total
of Sick and unfit for duty amounted to 3,300 Men, and he
says, they have no Medicines.

Such a Report is scarcely

credible, but you may learn the particulars yourself from
him, as he intends going to Philadelphia.^
There is no record of Sam Adams' reaction to this news.

But

Congress had indeed received earlier warnings of the smallpox toll on

i
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the Continental forces operating in Canada.

John Adams, who was also

serving with his cousin Sam in the Continental Congress in
Philadelphia in 1776, had been informed by Samuel Chase (in a letter
sent from upstate New York on April 21st, 1776) that "we on the 5th,
had before Quebec, 2500 [Men], of which about 800 are in the Hospital
(the far greater part of the small Pox)."

2

By the summer of 1776, when the full impact of the disaster in
Canada had become painfully apparent, John Adams was busy assigning
the blame.

In his correspondence of June 9th from Philadelphia, he

enumerated eight reasons for the failure of the expeditions against
Quebec.

The last (eighth) one read:

"The Small Pox, an unexpected

Enemy, and more Terrible than British Troops, Indians, or even Tories,
3
invaded our Armies and defeated them more than once."
And in his
letter of July 2nd, John Adams ventured this prediction:

"The Small

Pox is an Enemy more terrible in my Imagination, than all others.
This Distemper will be the ruin of every Army from New England if
4
great Care is not taken."
As the American invasion of Canada collapsed in the summer months
of 1776, the smallpox was almost invariably cited as the chief villain
in the calamity.

Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, in his letter to

Major-General Philip Schuyler of June 13th, from his headquarters at

2
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St. Johns (Canada), wrote:
mostly with the small pox

"Near one half of our array are sick,
three thousand Men are sick here and at

Chamble[y] and no Room or Conveniency for them.

Major-General

John Sullivan, in his letter to Schuyler of June 24th from his
headquarters at Isle aux Noix (Canada), reported that "this Cowardly
affair [the headlong retreat from Quebec and Montreal] together with
the want of Discipline & that infernal Disorder the Small Pox has
ruined our Army."

And Major-General Horatio Gates, corresponding

with John Hancock, wrote from Ticonderoga (N.Y.) on July 16th as
follows:
I submitted and went with General Schuyler and General
Arnold to Crown Point, where we found the wretched remains
of what was once a very respectable Body of Troops. —

That

Pestilential disease, the Smallpox, had taken so deep a root
that the Camp had more the Appearance of a General Hospital
than an Army

I am exerting all my powers to prevent the

pestilence getting to Skeensborough [N.Y. ], for Should the
Militia order'd there be infected, we shall be distroy'd
beyond Example.^
When General Washington suggested to the Continental Congress in
the summer of 1775 that a major offensive be launched against the two

^Papers of the Continental Congress, (Roll 166.
152), 11:193.
6Ibid., 179.
^Ibid., (Roll 174.

Item No. 154), _I:15.
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Canadian strongholds, Montreal and Quebec, a majority of the members
of Congress enthusiastically agreed.
subsequently organized.

A two-pronged movement was

One pincer would travel from Forts

Ticonderoga and Crown Point in New York up along the western shore of
Lake Champlain and attack Montreal.

The other pincer, coming out of

Cambridge, would follow the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers into the St.
Lawrence.

The two pincers would then converge at Quebec for the final

conquest of Canada.

To implement these plans, Congress authorized the

creation of a Northern Department with General Schuyler as the
Commander-in-Chief.

The little army that assembled at Crown Point in

August of 1773 to invade Canada numbered perhaps 2000 men and was
under the command of Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery.

General

Schuyler, having fallen ill, stayed behind.
To look after his soldiers’ medical needs, the Congress, on
General Schuyler’s personal recommendation, approved the appointment
of Dr. Samuel Stringer of Albany as Medical Director.

It is believed

that Dr. Stringer established his General Hospital at or near Fort
George, which was also the headquarters of the Northern Department
during the Canadian campaign.

Congress, it seems, had hardly acted

soon enough in hiring Dr. Stringer.

As early as August 3rd, General

Schuyler was writing (from his headquarters at Ticonderoga) to
Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, that "the Troops sicken
q

alarmingly fast, ninety-two are now returned ill at this place."

Q

Peter Force, American Archives (Washington: M. St. Clair and
Peter Force, 1840), Fourth Series, 111:17.

38

Nevertheless, the invasion went forward.
Chambly on the Sorel River in Canada fell to the Americans on
September 24th.

St. John's was captured on November 3rd.

Montreal surrendered on November 12th.

And

however, sickness, desertions,

and the expirations of enlistments had reduced General Montgomery’s
original army to about five-hundred effectives.

Leaving behind troops

to garrison St. John's and Montreal, Montgomery with some threehundred soldiers marched swiftly to join Colonel Arnold in the final
stage of the expedition, the siege of Quebec.

From the available

records, the smallpox had not yet made serious inroads on the
Americans.

But as the investment of Quebec began in December of 1775,

cases of smallpox were being reported.

The virus had probably been

brought from Montreal by Montgomery's men.
Anticipating that the invasion of Canada by the Continental
regiments in the Northern Department had been set in motion, General
Washington on August 20th wrote to Philip Schuyler from headquarters
in Cambridge confirming a coordinate plan "to penetrate into Canada,
by way of [the] Kennebeck River, and so to Quebec, by a Route 90 Miles
below Montreal - I can very well spare a Detachment of 1000 or 1200
9
Men."
Colonel Arnold was designated by Washington to lead the
detachment as its commanding officer.
Although they were not mentioned in the official orders, Arnold's

9
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detachment included several medical personnel.

Dr. Isaac Senter and

his three helpers were attached to the overall command.

Young Senter,

only twenty-two years old, who accompanied Colonel Arnold to the gates
of Quebec and who was one of the lucky few to return safely from the
Canadian campaign, is the best medical eyewitness to the events that
took place there.

He kept a diary of his activities.

This has been

preserved as The Journal of Isaac Senter and is an invaluable record
of the sufferings and privations of the Continental soldiers in this
ill-fated venture.
The story of the march through the Maine wilderness is one of the
great adventures of all time.

Yet, in spite of the incredible

difficulties and hardships, in mid-November of 1773, in the opinion of
Colonel Duncan, "the impossible had been achieved, and Arnold stood on
the Plains of Abraham.

Had his force been large enough, even two

thousand men, Canada would have become part of the United States.
But the Continental Army had been decimated by desertions and disease.
It was in too weakened a condition to exploit its initial advantage.
After a futile bloody assault on the citadel of Quebec on December
31st, in which General Montgomery was killed and Benedict Arnold was
wounded, the invaders were forced to withdraw.
the narrative.

Dr. Senter picks up

Writing in his diary on January 6th, 1776, he comments

on the growing smallpox problem:

■^Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1773 1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Services School, 1931),
90.
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The small-pox still continued in the army.

Numbers of

the soldiers inoculated themselves, and indeed several
officers, tho' contrary to orders at this time.

Scarce any

of the New England recruits had ever had the disorder, and
coming into the army when it was very brief, gave
apprehension of taking it in the natural way.

11

Failure at Quebec demoralized and discouraged the Americans.
siege of Quebec was lifted and the retreat commenced.

The

Dr. Senter

describes his role in preventing outbreaks of smallpox among the
returning soldiers:
I was ordered by Gen. [John] Thomas, who commanded, to
repair to Montreal and erect an hospital for their
reception, as well by the natural way as inoculation.
accordingly made application to General Arnold

I

[Arnold had

been promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General], then
commanding in the city, and obtained a fine capacious house
belonging to the East India Company.
nigh six hundred.

It was convenient for

I generally inoculated a regiment at a

class, who had it so favourable as to be able to do garrison
duty during the whole time

Gen. Thomas caught the

natural small pox, sickened at Sorel, was carried to
Chamblee and died

Our army, weakened by the smallpox,

and in fine every movement against the enemy unsuccessful, a

^ The Journal of Isaac Senter (Philadelphia: Historical Society
of Pa., 1846), 141.
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retreat was ordered to St. John's.

12

General Washington in Cambridge received the first reports of the
setback at Quebec on January 17th, 1776.

But five months elapsed

before he made any comments (in writing) concerning the role that the
smallpox had played in bringing about the disaster.

The death of

General John Thomas elicited this brief observation (in a letter to
Brigadier-General John Sullivan sent on June 13th from New York City):
"Having received Intelligence of the unfortunate Death of General
Thomas, occasioned by the small Pox he had taken, the Command of the
13
Army in Canada devolves on you."

On July 7th, after the facts of

the defeat and retreat from Canada had become well known, he shared
these further thoughts with Governor Trumbull of Connecticut:
The situation of the Northern Army is certainly
distressing, but no relief can be afforded by me; this I am
persuaded you will readily agree to.

I should Supppose, If

proper precautions are taken, the Small pox may be prevented
from spreading,

this was done at Cambridge, and I trust

will be contrived by Generals Schuyler and Gates, who are
well apprized of the fatal Consequences that may attend its
infecting the whole Army.

14

Washington’s statements of sympathy and good advice had no

12
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practical impact in mitigating the smallpox epidemics then raging in
the Northern Department.

Without any real guidance from the

Commander-in-Chief, the situation soon deteriorated into a state of
contradictions and confusion.

Thus, the irony of Dr. Senter,

according to his own account, busy inoculating the regiments of
Continental soldiers while his superiors were simultaneously issuing
orders outlawing the procedure:
General Orders before QUEBECK, MARCH 15, 1776.
As the spreading [of] the Small-Pox at this juncture
will probably prove the entire ruin of the Army, the
officers are desired to take all possible care to prevent
it, by keeping the men from strolling from their quarters.
The Surgeons of the Army are forbid, under the severest
penalty, to inoculate any person.

And as many officers and

men are preparing for the small-pox, it is said with an
intention of taking it by inoculation; to prevent the fatal
consequences attending such conduct, those who are found
guilty, if officers, will be immediately cashiered; if
private soldiers, punished at the discretion of a CourtMartial."^
The only preventive smallpox measures that appear to have had the
unanimous endorsement of the authorities - by the field commanders in
the Northern theater of operations as well as by the Commander-inChief - were isolation and quarantine:

15
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General Orders before QUEBECK, FEBRUARY 11, 1776.
Whereas the repeated orders given to prevent the
spreading of that fatal disorder the Small-Pox, have been in
a great measure disregarded; it is ordered that the
commanding officer of every company immediately send such of
his company as are seized with it to the Hospital; and all
soldiers who shall know of any persons with that disorder in
their private quarters, and do not make immediate complaint
thereof to the Barrackmaster, shall be treated as neglecting
16
the orders.

their duty, and guilty

of a breach of

During the late winter

and early spring of 1776,General

Washington apparently still nourished hopes of a victory at Quebec and
he diligently continued to send whatever supplies and reinforcements
he could spare to the north.

But the flow of ominous tidings from

Canada did not support his optimism.

For instance, General Moses

Hazen communicated to General Schuyler from Montreal on April 1st:

"I

have pretty good information that our strength in camp before Quebeck
did not, on the 18th of March, much exceed

that of theday after

General Montgomery*s fall. General Arnold had at that time about four
hundred men in a small-pox H o s p i t a l . A n d General David Wooster,
now in command at Quebec, sent to Congress on April 10th this gloomy
appraisal:

"Troops come in to our assistance but slowly; and a great

part of them who have arrived have been but of very little service, on

16Ibid., V:550.
17Ibid., 751-2.
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account of the small-pox.”

On May 1st, a Congressional Commission

sent to Canada from Philadelphia to evaluate firsthand the worsening
outlook in the Northern Department, concluded their report from
Montreal with these prophetic words:

"The small-pox is in the Army,

19
and General Thomas has, unfortunately, never had it.”
The arrival in Canada of strong British reinforcements in the
spring of 1776 put an end to the American invasion of its northern
neighbor.

The hasty withdrawal that had begun from Quebec in May

continued until the last of the Continental troops were back on their
own territory by mid-summer.

The best that General Washington could

anticipate was that the retreat would remain orderly and would not
turn into a disastrous rout.

Hie counted on his newly-appointed

commander, General John Sullivan, to implement this difficult and
dismal assignment when he wrote him on June 13th:

”1 am therefore, to

request your most strenuous Executions to retrieve our Circumstances
in that Quarter, from the melancholy Situation they are now in, and
for performing the arduous Tasks of bringing Order out of
Confusion.
However strong his exertions might have been, General Sullivan
could not seem to find a quick and satisfactory solution to the
smallpox infections that continued to plague his army.

On July 29th,

for instance, General Gates forwarded this depressing dispatch to

■^Ibid., 845-6.
■^Ibid., 1166.
20
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General Washington:
Those troops, when they arrive [from Canada], are all
ordered to halt at Skenesborough. Everything about this
Army is infected with the pestilence; the clothes, the
blankets, the air, and the ground they walk upon.

To put

this evil from us, a General Hospital is established at Fort
George, where there are now between two and three thousand
sick, and where every infected person is immediately sent;
but this care and caution has not yet effectually destroyed
the disease here; it is notwithstanding continually breaking
out.21
Not only was the smallpox taking its toll of sick and dying
soldiers, the fear of catching the deadly disease was seriously
undermining morale and thus greatly hampering the enlistment of new
recruits for the Continental service.

That was the gist of Governor

Trumbull's letter of July 4th to General Washington:
The prevalence of the small pox among them [the troops]
is every way unhappy; our people in General have not had
that Distemper.

Fear of the Infection operates strongly to

prevent Soldiers from engageing in the service and the
Battalions Ordered to be raised in this Colony [Connecticut]
fill up slowly.^

21
22

Force, American Archives, Fifth Series, .1:650-1.
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In fact, in his letter the very next day (July 5th) to John Hancock
in Philadelphia, Governor Trumbull outlined the monetary inducements
that the Connecticut Legislature had decided to pass in order to try
to help boost enlistments to fill the ranks of the Continental Line:
[Because] the small pox in Canada naturally would deter
those from engageing in the Service who had never passed
thro' that Distemper, it was thought necessary by the
Assembly to encourage them to Enlist by offering them a
Bounty, and accordingly six pounds as a bounty to each able
bodied man that should inlist into the Batallion destined
for Canada and three pounds for those destined to New
York.

23

The ultimate goal that the military and political leaders were
seeking to realize was a practical and expedient way of bringing to an
end the constant menace of devastating outbreaks of smallpox epidemics
in the Continental Army.

"Are there no measures [that] may be taken

to remove the impediment [and] may not the Army soon [be] freed from
that Infection?"

24

This is how Governor Trumbull put the question

to General Washington in his letter of July 4th.

On July 5th, the

Governor sought to promote with President Hancock the idea of
assigning Connecticut troops to more healthy theaters (like New York)
instead of to the Northern Department as one means of hedging the
smallpox threat:

23Ibid., (Roll 80.
24Ibid., (Roll 166.

Item No. 66), I_:193.
Item No. 152), 11:205-7.
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Might not some of our Troops be sent to New York and
serve there instead of the York or Jersey Battalions, which
have generally passed thro that distemper, such an Exchange
would be very agreeable, and greatly facilitate the filling
up [of] our Regiments; our Intelligence from Crown point
shows the Infection to be very great in our returning
Army.

25

Following the abandonment of Canada, there was much fingerpointing and soul-searching.

John Adams in the Continental Congress,

among the earliest and strongest Congressional supporters of the
Canadian invasion and later probably the most vociferous critic of the
manner in which it had been carried out, asked this question in his
correspondence (with Samuel Cooper[?]) of June 9th:

"The Small Pox is

a Terrible Enemy, but why could not this have been kept out of the
Camp before Quebec?"
25th:

26

Dr. John Morgan wrote to Sam Adams on June

"Had there been a General Hospital in Canada, there would have

been better Order, and some Subordination obtained, which is now
wholly wanting." 27

General Philip Schuyler, corresponding with John

Hancock on August 16th, placed the blame for the smallpox calamity
squarely on the unauthorized practice of inoculation:
I am just now informed, by good authority, that some of

25Ibid., (Roll 80.

Item No. 66), 1:193.
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the Militia from the eastward have inoculated themselves on
the march to Skenesborough

I am also informed that all

the Field-Officers of one regiment have done the same at
Skenesborough. I shall instantly write to General Gates on
the subject, and direct that none of them be suffered to
join the Army to prevent this terrible disaster from again
distressing us.^
General Schuyler was among the foremost of the commanders in the
Northern Department notorious for his facility for straddling the
inoculation issue.

On February 15th, 1777, for example, he

communicated to Congress that "I fear Nothing will prevent Villains
from continuing to inoculate in the Army, unless a Resolution of
Congress making it Death for any Officer or Soldier to suffer himself
to be inoculated and for any person that does it."

29

Yet a month

later, on March 8th (perhaps because he had in the meantime received
instructions from the Commander-in-Chief), he wrote to Congress again,
this time expressing the exact opposite sentiments:

"His Excellency

General Washington has recommended to me to assist the Army in this
[Northern] Department to be inoculated: it appears highly
necessary.

„30

The role of the medical personnel of the Continental Army in the

28
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Canadian campaign is a blurred picture.

Dr. Samuel Stringer, the

Medical Director of the Northern Department, apparently ran the
General Hospital at Fort George throughout the period and was
responsible for the care of the returning sick and wounded soldiers.
His hospital records have been lost.

Of the regimental surgeons and

mates who had accompanied General Montgomery's army, virtually nothing
is known.

Only Dr. Senter has managed to preserve his personal

glimpses of the expedition.

General Washington in Cambridge (and

later in New York) was too far removed by distance to exercise any
direct operational control over the medical problems facing his
soldiers in Canada.

He had to rely almost entirely on the judgment

and good sense of his field commanders.

Unfortunately, the lack of

central authority, and in particular an established policy on
inoculation, led to many of the contradictions in orders and probably
to much of the resulting chaos and confusion.
Quantitatively, what was the extent and impact of the smallpox on
the Continental Army in Canada?

One "Return of Troops in Canada, May

11, 1776," shows the following enumeration:
Fit for Duty

Sick

Colonel Reed's Regt., N.H...............

350

81

Colonel Stark's Regt., N.H..............

389

40

Colonel Poor's Regt., N.H...............

406

96

Colonel Patterson's Regt., Mass.........

238

71

Greaton's Regt., Mass...........

281

52

Bond's Regt., Mass..............

230

43

Colonel Wayne's, Penn...................

128

28

50

Fit for Duty

Sick

Irvine's, Penn..................

609

33

Dayton's, N.J..................

528

28

Wind's, N.J....................

377

28

De Haas', Penn..................

471

68

Bedel's, N.H...................

106

53

Maxwell's, N.J..................

227

64

Burrell's, Conn.................

279

263

Porter's ......................

109

254

St. Clair's, Penn...............

312

51

5040

125331

Although thisparticular
can beinferred
smallpox.

tabulationdoes

not give any breakdowns, it

that one of thechiefcausesof sickness

was the

An earlier report from Quebec - "A Return of the Troops

before QUEBECK, in the service of the United Colonies, MARCH 30, 1776"
- which is shown as Fig. 1 on the following page (51), does specify
the smallpox cases and thus tends to confirm this assumption.
The inhabitants of the American colonies in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were afflicted with a wide variety of epidemic
diseases: smallpox, diptheria, scarlet fever, yellow fever, measles,
whopping cough, mumps, tubverculosis, malaria, dysentery, typhoid
fever, and syphilis, to name some of the most common maladies.

Yet

the single disease in this list that was universally dreaded and that
claimed so many fatalities, smallpox, was also the single disease that

31

Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution, 108.

R eg im e n t s .

.S3

CJ

in

Total.

Return of the Troops before Quebeck, in the service of
the United Colonies, M a k c h 3 0 , 1770.

Effectives.

A

D isorders .

Colonel Warner’s...... 102 271 373Sma11-Poxbyinocula
tion.
Major Cady’s.... ..... 82 50 132 Do.
do.
Colonel De Haas's...... •225 - 2=15
Major Brown’sDetachment... 3d 13-2 170 Do.
do.
General Wooster’s...... 4‘
2 48 00
Do.
do.
Colonel McDougall’s..... 7ti 115 101Small Pox, great and
various.
C.donel Van Siliaick’s... 81 77 158Various.
Colonel Clinton's....... ‘
207 20 227Various.
Colonel Holmes’s....... 01 23 114Various.
Colonel Livingston's..... 20(1 . 200.
General Arno'd's....... 117 50 167Variousandwounded
Captain Wool’sArtillery.. 31 - 31
Colonel Dnegan's....... 123 . 123
Colonel Mavwell’s...... 210 . 216
Colonel Fellows’s....... 8-2 - 82
Total........... 1710 7862505
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could best be coped with by the medical men of that era.

At least

they knew how to use quarantine and isolation to control its spread;
and inoculation to help prevent infection and provide immunity.
This elementary knowledge by itself was not sufficient to keep
the smallpox scourge from continuing its ravages throughout the early
period of the Revolutionary War for two basic reasons:

First, none of

the initial preventive measures was adequately and consistently
employed; and second, none of the known steps to control smallpox was
risk-free.

Therefore, it was soon apparent to the leaders of the

Revolution that tough decisions would have to be made and enforced in
order to clear up the ambivalence.

Specifically, a firm policy

regarding quarantine and inoculation needed to be established to deal
effectively with the ever-present threat of smallpox to the
Continental soldiers gathered in army camps and marching units.

The

leaders recognized that while the smallpox plague could never be
completely eliminated, it could definitely be minimized.
Thus, the Canadian disaster did have a very positive effect: it
set the stage for a resolute policy on inoculation.

While most agreed

that something had to be done to avert another Canadian-type fiasco,
it was up to the Commander-in-Chief to make the final determination.
Quarantine and isolation had worked well enough during the Boston
siege, but it had proven inadequate in Canada.
of its known risks, was an answer.

Inoculation, in spite

The decision on whether or not to

accept the risks now rested with General Washington.

CHAPTER III

SMALLPOX AND THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

On January 6th, 1777, from his winter headquarters at Morristown,
N.J., General Washington wrote to the then Medical Director of the
Continental Amy, Dr. William Shippen, Jr., detailing the following
specific instructions with respect to inoculation:
Finding the small pox to be spreading much and fearing
that no precaution can prevent it from running thro' the
whole of our Amy, I have determined that the Troops shall
be inoculated.

This expedient may be attended with some

inconveniences and some disadvantages, but yet I trust, in
its consequences will have the most happy effects.
Necessity not only authorizes but seems to require the
measure, for should the disorder infect the Amy, in the
natural way, and rage with its usual Virulence, we should
have more to dread from it, then from the Sword of the
Enemy.

Under these circumstances, I have directed Doctr.

Bond, to prepare immediately for inoculating in this
Quarter, keeping the matter as secret as possible, and
request, that you will without delay inoculate all the
Continental Troops that are in Philadelphia and those that

53
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shall come in, as fast as they arrive.

You will spare no

pains to carry them thro' the disorder with the utmost
expedition, and to have them cleansed from the infection
when recovered, that they may proceed to Camp, with as
little injury as possible, to the Country thro' which they
pass.

If the business is immediately begun and favoured

with the common success, I would fain hope they will be soon
fit for duty, and that in a short space of time we shall
have an Army not subject to this, the greatest of all
calamities that can befall it, when taken in the natural
way.

1

Thus, by a stroke of his pen, General Washington put an end to
the long-running inoculation controversy; at least insofar as the
military forces under his jurisdiction were concerned.

Hie

Continental Army now had in place a firm and clearly stated policy on
inoculation which everyone would come to understand (once the initial
secrecy was lifted) and which every soldier was expected to obey.

The

personal discretion of the individual field commanders in this matter
had been replaced by the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

The

Medical Department could proceed to establish proper hospital
facilities for treating its smallpox patients.

New recruits were

assured that they would be given the best available protection against
the smallpox virus.

Immunized soldiers could move with relative

^■John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), _6:473-4.
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freedom in areas where the smallpox was endemic without fear of
contracting it.

General Washington's landmark order of January 6th

was carried out for the most part effectively and efficiently by the
medical personnel of the Continental Army.

In retrospect, the action

proved successful in achieving its objectives.
For approximately the first eighteen months of his command,
however, Washington seemed committed to pursuing an anti-inoculation
policy.

He did so for several valid reasons.

Many of the colonies

had statutes on the books prohibiting inoculation and Washington, as a
public figure, prided himself on obeying the law.

As has been

emphasized in previous chapters, public opinion itself was sharply
divided, often very passionately, on the issue.

Enlistments were

dropping off; perhaps in part due to the smallpox scare.

In New York

in the spring and summer of 1776, sickness and disease had begun to
take a serious toll of the men of the Continental Army.

Colonel

Duncan records that "a return of the army [in New York] at the middle
of September [1776] showed that of the rank and file there were
present, fit for duty, 15,243; present sick, 6,098; absent sick,
1,215.
army."

The total number of sick was 8,528, more than a third of the
2

A program of mandatory inoculation might well serve to

worsen the medical crisis.

In any case, on May 20th, General

Washington issued these stringent orders:
No Person whatever, belonging to the Army, is to be

2
Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775—
1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service School, 1931), 7.
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innoculated for the Small-Pox— those who have already
undergone that operation, or who may be seized with Symptoms
of that disorder, are immediately to be removed to the
Hospital provided for that purpose on Montresor Island.

Any

disobedience to this order, will be most severely punished—
As it is at present of the utmost importance, that the
spreading of that distemper, in the Army and City, should be
prevented.^
On May 20th, this interesting episode concerning the ban on
smallpox inoculations appeared in Washington’s General Orders:
In Provincial Congress, New York, May 25, 1776.
Doctor Foster appearing before the Committee says, that
information was given to General Putnam, that several
persons had been inoculated, at the house of one Fisher, in
Stone Street, contrary to a resolve of the Provincial
Congress of this Colony, he, the examinant (agreeable
to Genl: Putnam's order) immediately went to the house of
the above mentioned Fisher, where he discovered that Lt.
Colonel Moulton, Capt. Parks, Doctor Hart and Lieut. Brown
had been inoculated by Doctor Azor Betts.
Doctor Azor Betts being sent for, appeared before the
Committee, allowed the charge against him, and offer’d in
his vindication— that he had been repeatedly applied to by
the officers of the Continental Army to inoculate them, that

3
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he refused but being overpersuaded, he at last inoculated
the persons above-mentioned.
Resolved, That Doctor Azor Betts, be committed to the
Gaol of this City, and be kept in safe custody, until
released by the Provincial Congress.
Ordered, That a Copy of the minutes relating to Doctor
Azor Bett's case, be handed to the Provincial Congress...
Messrs. Berrian and Harpur further inform, that the
wife of Azor Betts, on her examination, says That Lieut.
Seymour from Long Island had informed her, that seven
persons of the Army (Officers as she understood) on Long
Island, were taking mercurial preparations, and as he
supposed, were inoculated, or preparing to be inoculated for
the small pox.
Ordered. That a Copy of the report of the General
Committee, to this Congress, be delivered to Major Genl.
Putnam— that he give such direction to the Continental Army,
for preventing the Small Pox among them on Long Island, as
he may think necessary.
Since General Washington at this time was not in favor of
inoculation for the officers and men of the Continental Army, he
readily agreed with the above findings of the New York Provincial
Congress:
The General presents his Compliments to the Honorable

^Ibid., 62-3.
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the Provincial Congress, and General Committee, is much
obliged to them, for their Care, in endeavouring to prevent
the spreading of the Small-pox (by Inoculation or any other
way) in this City, or in the Continental Army, which might
prove fatal to the army, if allowed of, at this critical
time, when there is reason to expect they may soon be called
to action; and orders that the Officers take the strictest
care, to examine into the state of their respective Corps,
and thereby prevent inoculation amongst them; which, if any
Soldier should presume upon, he must expect the severest
punishment.
Any Officer in the Continental Amy, who shall suffer
himself to be inoculated, will be cashiered and turned out
of the army, and have his name published in the News papers
throughout the Continent, as an Enemy and Traitor to his
Country.
Upon the first appearance of any eruption, the Officer
discovering of it in any Soldiers, is to give information to
the Regimental Surgeon, and the Surgeon make report of the
same, to the Director General of the hospital."*
It is impossible to say from the available records exactly when
General Washington decided to completely reverse his course and to
embrace, instead of condemn, inoculation.
military necessity.

5Ibid., 83-4.

Perhaps he was pushed by

Perhaps the initiative came from the Continental
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Congress.

Perhaps the Congress and Washington had agreed that an

official policy endorsing inoculation was essential to preserve the
health of the Continental Army.

That some consultation occurred is

suggested by the resolution Congress adopted on February 12th, 1777:
Ordered, That the Medical Committee write to General
Washington, and consult him on the propriety and expediency
of causing such of the troops in his army, as have not had
the small pox, to be inoculated, and recommend that measure
to him, if it can be done consistent with the public safety,
and good of the service.
The decision to inoculate all Continental soldiers (including new
recruits) and the consequent need to set aside hospital facilities for
their proper care and treatment helped pave the way for a more formal
structuring of the Medical Department.

On February 27th, 1777, the

Congress recommended the following plan for organizing three medical
districts to cover the thirteen colonies:
The Medical Committee having taken into their
consideration a plan for establishing Military Hospitals,
[transmitted to Congress by General Washington] agree to
report— -Section 1.
three districts.
Potomac.

That the Continent be divided into

Ihe Middle to extend from Hudsons river to

The Southern to extend from Potomac to Georgia,

and the Northern from Hudsons river to Quebec or Crown

Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1905), VII:110.
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Point.^
General Washington’s own detailed plans for organizing the
hospitals are described in his letter to Dr. John Cochran, sent from
Morristown, N.J., on January 20th, 1777:
You are to proceed from hence [Morristown], to morrow,
and there inquire into the state of the small pox and use
every possible means in your power, to prevent that
spreading in the Army and among the Inhabitants, which may
otherwise prove fatal to the service; To that end you are to
take such Houses, as will be convenient, in the most retired
parts of the Country and best calculated to answer that
purpose.

You will then proceed to Philadelphia and consult

Doctor Shippen the Director, about forming an Hospital for
the ensuing Campaign, in sucha manner,
Wounded may be taken the bestcare of,

as that the Sick and
and the

inconveniences in that Department, so much complain'd of,
the last Campaign, may be remedied in future.

You will

also, in conjunction with Doctor Shippen, point out to me,
in writing, such Officers and Stores, as you may think
necessary for the arrangement of an Hospital, in every
branch of the Department, as well to constitute one for an
Army in the field, which may be stileda flying Hospital; as
also, fixed Hospitals in such

parts ofthe Country,as the

nature of the service from time to time may require.

7Ibid., 161-2.
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your standard be for 10,000 Men for one Campaign, and so in
proportion for a greater or less number, as you may
o

hereafter be ordered.
In the overall organization chart that evolved, Dr. William
Shippen, Jr. continued in his post as "Director General of the
American Hospitals."

Dr. John Cochran was confirmed as the "Physician

and Surgeon General of the Army in the Middle Dept."

And on May 18th,

1776, the Congress "proceeded to the election of a director of the
Hospitals in Virginia; and the ballots being taken, William Rickman
was elected director and chief physician of the hospital in
9
Virginia."
When inoculation was adopted as Army policy, Alexandria
was selected as the main site for an inoculation station and it became
mandatory for all of the regiments coming up from the Southern
colonies to pause at Alexandria for inoculation."^
There were, of course, other inoculation hospitals in the
colonies but their records have not survived and little if anything is
known of their operations.

However, because of a number of serious

complaints by Continental Army officers about Dr. Rickman and his
performance (that led to his dismissal later on), and because some of
these records have been preserved, it is possible to gain an
insight into the day-to-day activities at the Alexandria inoculation
hospital during a brief period in the year 1777.

Between September

8
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22nd and November 30th (1777), 773 men were received into Dr.
Rickman's hospital stations ; 693 were discharged to duty; 21 died; 1
was reported down; and 58 remained hospitalized."^
In an undated affidavit, Colonel John Wiliams of the 9th North
Carolina Regiment "declares that he thinks there was great neglect &
mismanagement of the Officers & Soldiers Inoculated for the smallpox
at Alexandria under the care of Doctr Rickman, that the men in general
complained of being neglected, the Director seldom appearing leaving
the business to his assistants... That he was called upon to view
these men who were in a misirable condition in a cold part of the
house without one blanket to cover them, in a little straw, that he
sent for Mr. Parker one of the assistant's, Doctor Rickman being in
the Country, who refused to attend, untill he was brought by Force,
who excused himself by saying that

he did not know the men

were inso

bad a situation.... there wereabout 300 inoculated out of whom 20
died.

12

Another affidavit from Lieutenant John Crittenden, dated February
26, 1778, tends to confirm Colonel Williams' account:

"John

Crittenden Lieut in the 5th Virga Regiment being duly sworn deposeth &
saith that he was informed by the Soldiers there was very little care
and attention paid to them while under Inoculation for the Small pox
at Alexandria; that he never saw Doctor Rickman in the Barracks where

"^Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Microcopy 247,
Roll 101, Item No. 78), XIX:139.
12Ibid., (Roll 73.

Item No. 59). 111:189.
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his men were sick, tho' he was absent on days when they were at the
worst, having been called to Williamsburg by Colo. Mason, & that he
understood but one dose of Physick was given to a man before he had
the Small Pox & numbers had none afterward."

13

Jacob Walker, a Captain in the Continental Artillery, however,
submitted this dissenting opinion on January 20th, 1778:

"I hereby

certifie that I was under the small pox under care of Doctor Rickman
at Alexandria and that during my continuance there which was I believe
near six weeks, as far as I was capable of judging, he paid the
strictest attention to the soldiers under his care in the small pox
that his constant custom was to visit the soldiers round every morning
and never failed either giving himself or sending Doctr. Dixon or
Parker when ever sent for to a sick soldier.

As I lodged with Doctor

Rickman when I was at Alexandria his diligence necessarily came under
my observation.

I remember once or twice he had left his bed when

called on by a soldier.

Hie Doctor never that I remember was absent

two days together from Alexandria during my stay there.
Alexandria in October and left in November.

I was at

There were some Carolina

Troops and many new recruits for the Virginia Regiments then under the
small pox. »1A
Anthony T. Dixon, an apothecary, confirmed the positive side of
the testimony in his affidavit of February 7th, 1778:

"I here by

Certify that Doctr Rickman attended the Carolina and Virginia Troops

13Ibid., (Roll 101. Item No. 78), XIX:119
14Ibid., 107.

64

that were Inoculated at Alexandria with the greatest care and
diligence.

That he prescribed medicines which I dispersed to them

before and after the Smallpox.

That I did not have an Officer or

Soldier that suffered for want of his attendance nor did he absent
himself from duty when his assistance was required neither did I ever
hear any Complaint from Colonel Williams or any Other officer of
neglect, and in my Opinion they had the attendance both by the
Director & his assistant-These and other testimonials were duly forwarded to the
Continental Congress:

’’Congress having received information that the

inoculation of recruits in the hospital in the State of Virginia has
of late been attended with much ill success; Resolved, That the
Medical Committee make strict enquiry into the truth of this
16
information, and report to Congress with all possible despatch.’’
Ten days later, on December 20th, 1777, the Medical Committee decided
that the detrimental evidence was sufficient to call for the dismissal
of Dr. Rickman as director of the inoculation hospitals in Alexandria:
The Medical Committee, to whom it was referred to
enquire into the conduct of the director of the hospitals at
Alexandria, reported, "That from the information of several
officers in the Virginia and North Carolina regiments, which
are annexed, it appears obvious to the committee that Dr.
Rickman, director of the said hospitals, has been guilty of

15Ibid., 113.
16
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great neglect in not giving proper attendance to the
officers and soldiers under inoculation at Alexandria:"
The said report and the informations being read,
Resolved, That Dr. Rickman be immediately suspended,
and that he attend the Medical Committee, to answer the
several complaints exhibited against him.
Ordered, That the Medical Committee transmit to Dr.
Rickman a copy of the complaints against him, and direct his
attendance.
That the said committee write to Dr. Shippen, director
general, and direct him to send immediately a skilful
physician to take care of the sick and superintend the
inoculation of the soldiers at Alexandria."^
It required the combined (and occasionally the separate) efforts
of both the Continental Congress and the Commander-in-Chief to keep
the inoculation program on track.

As can be seen from the Alexandria

episode and the charges against Dr. Dr. Rickman, the Congress
seriously examined the complaints of the officers and men under
inoculation and it acted promptly to rectify any real or perceived
wrongs.

Throughout the critical years of 1777-8, when it was

especially vital to rebuild the strength of the Continental Army and
to boost its spirit and morale, General Washington used his authority
to see to it that his inoculation orders were fully obeyed and
properly executed.

17Ibid., 1039.

For example, his "General Orders" issued at Valley
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Forge on March 18th, 1778, emphasized the importance of the
inoculation procedures:
Inoculation for the Small Pox having been happily
performed on all the subjects in Camp it is necessary to
guard against the fatal effects of that disorder taken in
the natural way.

The Commander in Chief therefore enjoins

all officers commanding Regiments upon the arrival of
recruits or return of absent soldiers to make immediate and
strict inquiry whether they have had the Small Pox, and
order such as have not to be inoculated without loss of time
by the Regimental Surgeon; and in case of the Regiments
being unprovided with one to give instant notice to the
Surgeon General.^®
Washington had travelled an arduous path from the aftermath of
the Canadian disaster to the acceptance of smallpox inoculation as a
routine Army procedure. By June 17th, 1777, in a letter to General
Samuel Parsons from Middle Brook, N.J., he sounded very confident:
I have consulted, the Surgeon General upon the
propriety of those of your Brigade coming on [from
Peekskill, N.Y.] who have not had the small pox.

He tells

me that he does not apprehend the least danger, as there is
but one Woman in the whole Army who has it, and she will be
removed.^

18
Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 11:107.
19Ibid., 8:258-9.

CONCLUSION

"May not those objections be easily done away [with], by introducing
Inoculation into the State [of Virginia]?"
(George Washington to Governor Patrick
Henry of Virginia, April 13, 1777.)

Fig. 2 is a copy of the "RETURN of the SICK and WOUNDED in the
AMERICAN MILITARY HOSPITAL at Danbury [Connecticut] Eastern Department
FROM October 20th TO November 7th 1778" which lists the most common
"DISORDERS" that afflicted and immobilized soldiers and qualified them
for hospitalization and medical treatment.
illnesses and diseases are familiar.

Many of the names of the

Others are not.

The one thing,

however, that all of these sicknesses had in common was that nobody in
America during the Revolutionary War knew what caused them or how to
cure them.

The drugs and herbs and occasional bloodlettings

prescribed by the doctors for their patients were little better than
folk medicine.

More often than not, the prescriptions were worse than

the disorders.

Consequently, the casualties caused by these

infectious diseases far exceeded battlefield wounds.
Dr. James Thatcher, a surgeon in the Continental Army throughout
the Revolutionary War and one of the most astute and reliable
contemporary medical observers of the entire conflict (from 1775 to
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1783), "estimated the total deaths in the war as 70,000

As the

period of active hostilities covered seven years, 1775-1781 inclusive,
Dr. Thatcher's estimate gives a mortality [rate] of 10,000 per
2
year."
Colonel Louis Duncan, a twentieth-century military medical
authority, adds his own personal observation to the effect "that ten
men died of disease to every one whose life was taken by the enemy is
3
a safe estimate."
Snallpox accounted for a good many of these
deaths.

Exactly how many, it is impossible to say.

According to Dr.

Hugh Thursfield (in his 1940 article, "Smallpox in the American War of
Independence"), "it is on record that the deaths from the natural
[smallpox] disease exceeded 16 per cent and that the mortality from
the inoculated disease, when proper control was exercised, averaged
but one in three hundred, and that many regiments of five hundred men
4
were inoculated without a single loss."
As this thesis has pointed out, General Washington, in January of
1777, finally took the necessary action to bring to an end the
inoculation controversy in the Continental Army.

His mandatory

inoculation policy effectively served to cleanse the Army of the

2
Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775 1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Services School, 1931),
370.
3Ibid., 371.
4
Hugh Thursfield, "Smallpox in the American War of
Independence."
(1940):316-7.
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smallpox virus.

It was not solely a military decision; it had

apparently become an emotional issue with the General as well.

The

extent of the involvement of his personal feelings are perhaps best
captured in the following lines which he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel
Robert Harrison from Morristown, N.J., on January 20th, 1777:
I beg of you to consult, and in my name advise and
direct such measures as shall appear most effectual to stop
the progress of the Small pox; when I recall to mind the
unhappy situation of our Northern Army last year I shudder at
the consequences of the disorder if some vigorous steps are
not taken to stop the spreading of it.^
Even after the issuance of his mandatory inoculation order,
Washington continued to cajole, scold, and plead with his officers and
medical personnel (in a stream of memoranda and directives) to
practice what today would be called preventive medicine, inoculation
and quarantine, in maintaining the health of his soldiers.

Nor did

Washington spare the civilian sector once he had made up his mind to
promote actively a pro-inoculation campaign for the Continental Army.
Referring to the anti-inoculation statute in Virginia that was still
on the books, Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine
(Washington), in June of 1777:
Surely that Impolitic Act, restraining Inoculation in
Virginia, can never be continued.

If I was a Member of that

^John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), 7j38.

71

Assembly, I would rather move for a Law to compell the
Masters of Families to inoculate every Childbom within a
limited time under severe Penalties.
He had used essentially the same argument (again referring to the
Virginia anti-inoculation statute) when addressing Governor Patrick
Henry of Virginia on April 13th, 1777, while upbraiding the Governor
for the lagging enlistment quotas from his State:
The apologies you offer for your deficiency of Troops,
are not without some Weight; I am induced to believe, that
the apprehensions of the Small pox and its calamitous
consequences, have greatly retarded the Inlistments; but may
not these objections be easily done away [with], by
introducing Inoculation into the State, or shall we adhere
to a regulation preventing it, reprobated at this time, not
only by the Consent and usage of the greater part of the
civilized World, but by our Interest and own experience of
its utility?

You will pardon my observations on the Small

pox, because I know it is more destructive to an Army in the
Natural way, than the Enemy's Sword, and because I shudder,
when ever I reflect upon the difficulties of keeping it out,
and that, in the vicissitudes of War, the scene may be
transferred to some Southern State.^
In summary, the virtual elimination of the smallpox threat to the

6Ibid., 8:158.
7Ibid., 7:409.

72

Continental A m y after 1777 was indeed the outstanding medical success
story of the entire period of the Revolutionary War.

Thanks to

inoculation, the A m y was saved from the one disease (of all those
listed in Fig. 2) that could have seriously immobilized it and perhaps
even have destroyed it.
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